

Appendix A

Nonproliferation Policy and Joint Statement

This appendix contains a copy of the fact sheet on the President's *Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy* released by the White House on September 27, 1993. The fact sheet describes the major principles that guide the policy and the key elements of the policy. This appendix also contains a copy of the *Joint Statement by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery* agreed to during their meeting on January 14, 1994.

A.1 NONPROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROL POLICY FACT SHEET

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 27, 1993

FACT SHEET

NONPROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROL POLICY

The President today established a framework for U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them. He outlined three major principles to guide our nonproliferation and export control policy:

- Our national security requires us to accord higher priority to nonproliferation, and to make it an integral element of our relations with other countries.
- To strengthen U.S. economic growth, democratization abroad and international stability, we actively seek expanded trade and technology exchange with nations, including former adversaries, that abide by global nonproliferation norms.
- We need to build a new consensus -- embracing the Executive and Legislative branches, industry and public, and friends abroad -- to promote effective nonproliferation efforts and integrate our nonproliferation and economic goals.

The President reaffirmed U.S. support for a strong, effective nonproliferation regime that enjoys broad multilateral support and employs all of the means at our disposal to advance our objectives.

Key elements of the policy follow.

Fissile Material

The U.S. will undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons and within civil nuclear programs. Under this approach, the U.S. will:

- Seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium to ensure that where these materials already exist they are subject to the highest standards of safety, security, and international accountability.

- Propose a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards.
- Encourage more restrictive regional arrangements to constrain fissile material production in regions of instability and high proliferation risk.
- Submit U.S. fissile material no longer needed for our deterrent to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Act.
- Pursue the purchase of highly-enriched uranium from the former Soviet Union and other countries and its conversion to peaceful use as reactor fuel.
- Explore means to limit the stockpiling of plutonium from civil nuclear programs, and seek to minimize the civil use of highly-enriched uranium.
- Initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for plutonium disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary and economic considerations. Russia and other nations with relevant interests and experience will be invited to participate in this study.

The United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes. The United States, however, will maintain its existing commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan.

Export Controls

To be truly effective, export controls should be applied uniformly by all suppliers. The United States will harmonize domestic and multilateral controls to the greatest extent possible. At the same time, the need to lead the international community or overriding national security or foreign policy interests may justify unilateral export controls in specific cases. We will review our unilateral dual-use export controls and policies, and eliminate them unless such controls are essential to national security and foreign policy interests.

We will streamline the implementation of U.S. nonproliferation export controls. Our system must be more responsible and efficient, and not inhibit legitimate exports that play a key role in American economic strength while preventing exports that would make a material contribution to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missile that deliver them.

Nuclear Proliferation

The U.S. will make every effort to secure the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. We will seek to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the resources needed to implement its vital safeguards responsibilities, and will work to strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities.

Missile Proliferation

We will maintain our strong support for the Missile Technology Control Regime. We will promote the principles of the MTCR Guidelines as a global missile nonproliferation norm and seek to use the MTCR as a mechanism for taking joint action to combat missile proliferation. We will support prudent expansion of the MTCR's membership to include additional countries that subscribe to international nonproliferation standards, enforce effective export controls and abandon offensive ballistic missile programs. The United States will also promote regional efforts to reduce the demand for missile capabilities.

The United States will continue to oppose missile programs of proliferation concern, and will exercise particular restraint in missile-related cooperation. We will continue to retain a strong presumption of denial against exports to any country of complete space launch vehicles or major components.

The United States will not support the development or acquisition of space-launch vehicles in countries outside the MTCR.

For MTCR member countries, we will not encourage new space launch vehicle programs, which raise questions on both nonproliferation and economic viability grounds. The United States will, however, consider exports of MTCR-controlled items to MTCR member countries for peaceful space launch programs on a case-by-case basis. We will review whether additional constraints or safeguards could reduce the risk of misuse of space launch technology. We will seek adoption by all MTCR partners of policies as vigilant as our own.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

To help deter violations of the Biological Weapons Convention, we will promote new measures to provide increased transparency of activities and facilities that could have biological weapons applications. We call on all nations -- including our own -- to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention quickly so that it may enter into force by January 13, 1995. We will work with others to support the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons created by the Convention.

Regional Nonproliferation Initiatives

Nonproliferation will receive greater priority in our diplomacy, and will be taken into account in our relations with countries around the world. We will make special efforts to address the proliferation threat in regions of tension such as the Korean peninsula, the Middle East and South Asia, including efforts to address the underlying motivations for weapons acquisition and to promote regional confidence-building steps.

In Korea, our goal remains a non-nuclear peninsula. We will make every effort to secure North Korea's full compliance with its nonproliferation commitments and effective implementation of the North-South denuclearization agreement.

In parallel with our efforts to obtain a secure, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East, we will promote dialogue and confidence-building steps to create the basis for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. In the Persian Gulf, we will work with other suppliers to contain Iran's nuclear, missile, and Biological Weapons Convention ambitions, while preventing reconstruction of Iraq's activities in these areas. In South Asia, we will encourage India and Pakistan to proceed with multilateral discussions of nonproliferation and security issues, with the goal of capping and eventually rolling back their nuclear and missile capabilities.

In developing our overall approach to Latin America and South Africa, we will take account of the significant nonproliferation progress made in these regions in recent years. We will intensify efforts to ensure that the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China do not contribute to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

Military Planning and Doctrine

We will give proliferation a higher profile in our intelligence collection and analysis and defense planning, and ensure that our own force structure and military planning address the potential threat from weapons of mass destruction and missile around the world.

Conventional Arms Transfers

We will actively seek greater transparency in the area of conventional arms transfers and promote regional confidence-building measures to encourage restraint on such transfers to regions of instability. The U.S. will undertake a

comprehensive review of conventional arms transfer policy, taking into account national security, arms control, trade, budgetary and economic competitiveness consideration.

**A.2 NONPROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE MEANS OF
THEIR DELIVERY**

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

JOINT STATEMENT

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AND

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AND THE MEANS OF THEIR DELIVERY

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, during their meeting in Moscow on January 14, 1994, agreed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems represents an acute threat to international security in the period following the end of the Cold War. They declared the resolve of their countries to cooperate actively and closely with each other, and also with other interested states, for the purpose of preventing and reducing this threat.

The Presidents noted that the proliferation of nuclear weapons creates a serious threat to the security of all states, and expressed their intention to take energetic measures aimed at prevention of such proliferation.

- Considering the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the basis for efforts to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, they called for its indefinite and unconditional extension at conference of its participants in 1995, and they urged that all states that have not yet done so accede to this treaty.
- They expressed their resolve to implement effective measures to limit and reduce nuclear weapons. In this connection, they advocated the most rapid possible entry into force of the START I and START II treaties.
- They agreed to review jointly appropriate ways to strengthen security assurances for the states which have renounced the possession of the nuclear weapons and that comply strictly with their nonproliferation obligations.
- They expressed their support for the International Atomic Energy Agency in its efforts to carry out its safeguards responsibilities. They also expressed their intention to provide assistance to the Agency in the safeguards field, including through joint efforts of their relevant laboratories to improve safeguards.
- They supported the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and agreed with the need for effective implementation of the principle of full-scope IAEA safeguard as a condition for nuclear exports with the need for export controls on dual-use materials and technology in the nuclear field.
- They reaffirmed their countries' commitment to the conclusion as soon as possible of an international treaty to achieve a comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions and welcomed the decision to begin negotiations at the conference on disarmament. They declared their firm intentions to provide political support for the negotiating process, and appealed to other states to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are being held.

- They noted that an important contribution to the goal of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would be made by a verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and by the most rapid conclusion of an international convention to this effect with the widest possible participation of states and on a non-discriminatory basis.
- They agreed to cooperate with each other and also with other states to elaborate measures designed to prevent the accumulation of excessive stocks of fissile materials and over time to reduce such stocks.
- They agreed to establish a joint working group to consider:
 - including in their voluntary IAEA safeguards offers all source and special fissionable materials, excluding only those facilities associated with activities having direct national security significance;
 - steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of putting a portion of fissionable material under IAEA safeguards. Particular attention would be given to materials released in the process of nuclear disarmament and steps to ensure that these materials would not be used again for nuclear weapons.
- The Presidents also tasked their experts to study options for the long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly of plutonium, taking into account the issues of nonproliferation, environmental protection, safety, and technical and economic factors.
- They reaffirmed the intention of interested organizations of the two countries to complete within a short time a joint study of the possibilities of terminating the production of weapon-grade plutonium.
- The Presidents agreed that reduction of the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear materials is a high priority, and in this context they noted the usefulness of the September 1993 Agreement to cooperate in improving the system of controls, accounting, and physical protection for nuclear materials. They attached great significance to further joint work on the separate but mutually connected problems of accounting for nuclear materials used in the civilian and military fields.

Both Presidents favored a further increase in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

- As the heads of the countries that have the world's largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, they acknowledged particular responsibility for eliminating the threat posed by these weapons. In this context, they declare their resolute support for the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and their intention to promote ratification as rapidly as possible and entry into force of the Convention no later than 1995.
- To promote implementation of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, they welcomed the conclusion of the implementing documents for the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and agreed to conclude work in as short a time as possible on the implementing documents for the Bilateral Agreement on the Destruction of Chemical Weapons.
- The Presidents reaffirmed their desire to facilitate the safe, secure, timely, and ecologically sound destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation and the United States. They applauded the joint Chemical Weapons Destruction Work Plan recently concluded between the two countries which leads the way for the United States to provide an additional \$30 million in assistance to support an analytical chemical laboratory in Russia to facilitate chemical weapons destruction. The United States also agreed to consider appropriate additional measures to support Russia's chemical weapons destruction program.
- They reiterated the importance of strict compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons and of continued implementation of measures in accordance with the Russia-America-

British Statement of September 1992, which provided inter alia for the reciprocal visits of facilities and meetings between experts in order to ensure confidence in the compliance with the Convention.

- They supported convening a special conference of the states' parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons in order to consider measures that would contribute to transparency and thereby confidence in compliance with the Convention and its effectiveness.

The Presidents expressed the determination of their countries to cooperate with each other in preventing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

- They welcomed the conclusion of the Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Export of Missile Equipment and Technologies, signed in September 1993, noted the importance of the Agreement for ensuring mutually beneficial cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in the field of space exploration, and agreed to collaborate closely in order to ensure its full and timely implementation.
- The U.S. welcomed Russia's intention to join the Missile Technology Control Regime and undertook to cooperate with Russia in facilitation its membership at an early date. The Russian Federation and the United States of America are certain that further improving the MTCR, including the prudent expansion of membership, will help reduce the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technologies in the regional context as well.

The Presidents of the two countries agreed that, in addition to strengthening global norms of nonproliferation and working out agreements to this effect, close cooperation is essential in order to develop policies on nonproliferation applicable to specific regions posing the greatest risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

- They agreed that nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would represent a grave threat to regional and international security, and decided that their countries would consult with each other on ways to eliminate this danger. They called upon the DPRK to honor fully its obligation under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in connection with the Treaty, and to resolve the problems of safeguards implementation, inter alia, through dialogue between IAEA and DPRK. They also urged full and speedy implementation of the Joint Declaration of the ROK and the DPRK on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- They support efforts to reach agreement on the establishment of a multilateral forum to consider measures in the field of arms control in nonproliferation that could strengthen security in South Asia. They call on India and Pakistan to join in the negotiation of and become original signatories to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions and the proposed Convention to Ban Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Explosives and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each other's territories.
- They agreed that the U.S. and Russia, as co-chairs in the Middle East peace process, would actively promote progress in the activity of the working group for Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East, striving for speedy implementation of confidence-building measures and working towards turning the Middle East into a region free of weapons of mass destruction, where conventional forces would not exceed reasonable defense needs.
- They firmly supported the efforts of the UN Special Commission and the IAEA to put into operation a long-term monitoring system of the military potential of Iraq, and called upon Iraq to comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.